ERICKSON V. ERICKSON
716 A.2d92 (1993)

Procedure: Testator's daughter appealed from a decree of the Probate Court for the District of Madison admitting testator's will to probate. The Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven, Hodgson, J., granted daughter's motion in limine to exclude certain extrinsic evidence of testator's intentions, but dismissed appeal. Appeals were taken.

Facts: In 1988, the decedent two days after his marriage to defendant executed a will. The probate court admitted the decedent's will to probate which was appealed. Plaintiff filed a motion to limine to exclude extrinsic evidence of the decedent's intent. The trial court disallowed the extrinsic evidence based on the facts of the cases and also noted that will had provided for a contingency of plaintiff's marriage to defendant.

Issue: Should evidence of a scrivener's mistake be admissible to establish the testator's "true" intent?

Holding:The Supreme Court, Borden, J., held that trial court should have admitted extrinsic evidence regarding testator's intent that his will would not be revoked automatically by his subsequent marriage; overruling,

Rule: After making a will if the testator marries or divorced as defined in the section for which the testator has agreed and where no statement is made as to such marriage, divorce or any such thing will be considered as revocation. A will cannot be revoked if the spouse is not a beneficiary to the estate. (General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 45a-257 (a)).

Analysis:In Connecticut Junior Republic, this Court reasserted the familiar rule that, although extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove an intention not expressed in the will itself, or to prove a devise or bequest not contained in the will such evidence is admissible to identify a named devisee or legatee; to identify property described in the will; to clarify ambiguous language in the will; and to prove fraud, incapacity, or undue influence. In rejecting the claim that extrinsic evidence should also be admissible to prove a scrivener's error, the majority relied principally on the existing case law and on the risk of subverting the policy of the statute of wills. The majority acknowledged, however, that, as with any rule of law, time and experience could persuade to the contrary. Principles of law that serve one generation well may, by reason of changing conditions, disserve a later one. Experience can and often does demonstrate that a rule, once believed sound, needs modification to better serve justice.