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MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF COLLINS
453 N.E.2d 797 (1933)
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant companies appealed from an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County (Illinois) that denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff individual's personal injury action. Defendants contended that plaintiff's action was barred under the Illinois borrowing statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-210 (1981), because the injury occurred in California and would have been barred by the shorter California statute of limitations.
FACTS: A will was requested to be admitted to probate Five witnesses were produced and the actual will was also produced Those who witnessed the will had no recollection of the circumstances under which it was executed Based on this faulty memory, respondents moved that the will not be probated The court denied that motion and ruled that despite faulty memories, due execution could be established based on the attestation clause, the genuineness of the three signatures and the testimony of the physician regarding the mental competency of his then patient This appeal was taken The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed holding that at least one of the attesting witnesses must confirm that the testatrix signed the instrument and intended that it was her will
ISSUE: May a will be admitted to probate wherein both attesting witnesses cannot recall the events surrounding execution of the will but the court is otherwise satisfied that the will was properly executed from all the other evidence presented1? See the more general rule of law below
RULE OF LAW: A will may be admitted to probate wherein both attesting witnesses cannot recall the events surrounding execution of the will but the court is otherwise satisfied that the will was properly executed from all the other evidence presented
HOLDING AND DECISION: (Kaye, J) Plaintiff individual, a California resident, was injured in California and brought a personal injury action in Illinois against defendant companies, who were Illinois residents. Plaintiff's claim was barred under the applicable statute of limitations in California, but was timely under the statute of limitations contained in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-202 and 13-203. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that claim was barred under the Illinois borrowing statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, para. 13-210 (1981). The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed and the court granted leave to appeal. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court held that the borrowing statute did not apply because defendants were Illinois residents, and the statute applied only when the parties were non-residents. The court also held the application of the borrowing statute to non-resident's only did not violate defendants' right to equal protection of the laws under U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 and Ill. Const. art. I, § 2 (1970).
DECISION: REVERSED