BREEDEN V. STONE
992 P2d 1167 (2000)

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners, members of decedent's family, challenged the Colorado Court of Appeals' opinion affirming the probate court's decision for respondent putative heir in a dispute over the testamentary capacity of the decedent in the drafting of his holographic will.

FACTS: This was a dispute over a handwritten (holographic) will executed by Spicer Breeden. Spicer died from a self-inflicted gunshot wound two days after he was involved in a highly publicized hit-and-run accident mat killed the driver of the other vehicle. At the bottom of the handwritten document, the decedent printed, 'SPICER H. BREEDEN' and signed beneath his printed name. Stone (Respondent) offered the handwritten document for probate as the holographic will of the decedent. Spicer had previously executed a formal will in 1991 and a holographic codicil leaving his estate to persons other man Respondent. Breeden and others (Petitioners) alleged mat he lacked testamentary capacity. The court found mat the decedent used cocaine and alcohol for several years prior to his death. Relying on the autopsy report and testimony from the decedent's sister, the court found mat the decedent used alcohol and cocaine on the evening of March 17 and between March 17 and 19, and mat substantial alcohol was consumed proximate to the time of death. The court found mat the decedent's moods were alternately euphoric, fearful, and depressed, and mat he was excessively worried about threats against himself and his dog from government agents, friends, and others. After considering conflicting evidence from the various expert witnesses, the court concluded mat the decedent possessed the motor skills necessary to write his will and mat his handwriting on the holographic will was unremarkable when compared to other writing exemplars. Friends also testified mat in the two weeks prior to his death, the decedent had indicated to each of them in separate conversations mat he did not intend to leave his estate to his family. The probate court found mat the stress and anxiety mat compelled the decedent to commit suicide did not deprive him of testamentary capacity. The court also found mat the decedent's insane delusions regarding his friends, government agencies, and others, did not affect or influence the disposition of his property. It ruled mat the decedent was of sound mind at the time he executed the will. Petitioners asserted mat the probate court erred by applying and merging bom tests for sound mind. The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court, holding mat the probate court order, when read in its entirety, indicated mat the probate court correctly applied the appropriate tests for sound mind and correctly applied the Dead Man's Statute. This appeal resulted.

ISSUE: Are the general test for capacity to execute a will and the insane delusion test mutually exclusive?

RULE OF LAW: The general test for capacity to execute a will and the insane delusion tests are not mutually exclusive

HOLDING: Contestants of holographic will appealed probate court's ruling that testator was of sound mind when he executed will. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Rice, J., held that: (1) testator was of sound mind at time he executed will; and (2) probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying contestants' motion to dismiss them as parties thus precluding their testimony pursuant to Dead Man's Statute. Affirmed.

ANALYSIS: Just prior to his suicide, decedent penned a holographic will purporting to vest his estate in respondent putative heir; in doing so, he disinherited petitioners, members of decedent's family. Respondent offered the will for probate; petitioners challenged it claiming that decedent lacked testamentary capacity. The probate court held for respondent, finding that decedent possessed testamentary capacity. Petitioners appealed to the intermediate court and again to the instant court following the intermediate court's affirmance. The court affirmed, holding that one may have insane delusions regarding some matters, be insane on others, yet possess testamentary capable to execute a will if the delusions do not materially affect the will's disposition. Further, the Cunningham and insane delusion tests of testamentary capacity, although discrete, were not mutually exclusive and both could properly be applied to the same testator. Lastly, the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss.