Caban v. Mohammed
441 U.S. 380 (1979)



Procedure: Appellant father sought review of a judgment by the Court of Appeals of New York, which affirmed a judgment granting appellees, a mother and stepfather, adoption of appellant's children. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111 under which the children were adopted without his consent.

Facts: H and W lived together but were never married While they lived together, they had two children H was identified as the father and contributed to the support ofthe family In 1973, W took the two children and moved in with another man whom she married in 1974 H was able to see his children weekly as H lived above Ws mother In September of 1974, the grandmother took the children with her to Puerto Rico as W and HI were going to join them as soon as they saved enough money to start a business Eventually, H went to Puerto Rico and was given visitation with the children by the grandmother but he took them back to New York W then attempted to get the children by the use ofthe police Eventually the court gave the children back to W and give H and his new wife visitation In 1976, W and HI filed a petition to adopt the children H and his wife cross-petitioned for adoption The court granted the petition of W to adopt and thus cut off H's parental rights and obligations The New York Supreme Court affirmed The Supreme Court granted certiorari

Issue: Is a statute that requires maternal consent for adoption of illegitimate children constitutional as applied to a man who lived with the children for five years as their acknowledged father, who contributed to their support, and who has continued to maintain his relationship with them even after their mother has married another man?

Rule: A state law cannot take away the parental rights of a putative father to his children without his consent unless he can show mat the termination of his parental rights are not in the best interests ofthe child. The mere existence of a biological connection between a child and a putative father does not confer due process protection on the putative jfather's parental interests. A statute may not treat unmarried parents differently based on their gender.

Holding: No. The law provides mothers of illegitimate children with a total veto over their adoption, but gives fathers the right to prevent adoption by showing unfitness of the prospective adopting parent. Thus, it treats unmarried men and women differently according to their sex. Gender-based distinctions "must serve governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives" if they are to survive equal protection scrutiny. While mothers of illegitimate children often may be "closer" to them than their fathers are, this case proves that that generalization is not always true, especially when the children are older.
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