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Commonwealth v. Twitchell,
617 N.E.2d 609 (1993).
Procedure:Defendants appealed their convictions by the Superior Court Department (Massachusetts) for involuntary manslaughter on request of direct appeal.
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Facts: Massachusetts (P) prosecuted David and Ginger Twitchell (Ds) for in-voluntary manslaughter because their child, receiving only treatment by prayer, died of peritonitis caused by the perforation of his bowel, which had been ob-structed as a result of an anomaly known as Meckel's diverticulum. Evidence showed there is a high success rate if the condition is corrected by surgery. Ds are members of the Christian Scientist Church. According to the tenets of that church, they chose to treat the child's illness with prayer. Ds defended on the ground that the "spiritual treatment provision" of a Massachusetts statute pro-tected them against criminal prosecution for failure to seek medical treatment for their child. The trial court denied them the right to assert this defense before the jury. They were also denied the right to present to the jury part of a religious publication regarding religious exemption from criminal liability. They were convicted by a jury. Ds appeal.
Issues: Does entrapment by estoppel apply when an official assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and continues or initiates the conduct even though the official advice was later determined to be wrong?
Rule: Entrapment by estoppel applies when an official assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on that advice and continues or initiates the conduct even though the official advice was later determined to be wrong?
Holding & Analysis: In challenging their convictions, defendants claimed that the spiritual treatment provision of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 273, § 1 barred their prosecution because they were following the tenets of their Christian Science faith in refusing to get medical care for their son's peritonitis, which he died from. In conjunction with this argument, defendants alleged that given the provision and an opinion of the Massachusetts Attorney General on its effect, they did not receive fair warning that they could be charged with involuntary manslaughter. The court found that defendants were subject to a common law duty to provide for the care of their children, the breach of which could form the basis for an involuntary manslaughter charge. It found that the spiritual treatment provision did not foreclose an involuntary manslaughter charge and that the involuntary manslaughter statute gave fair warning to defendants. However, whether the Attorney General's opinion could have led defendants to believe that they did not need to obtain medical treatment for their son was a question of fact that should have been presented to the jury, and the failure to do so could have led to a miscarriage of justice.