LeClair v. LeClair,
624 A.2d 1350 (1993)


Facts: Mrs. LeClair (D) filed a petition requesting the court to order Mr. LeClair (P) to contribute towards their adult son's college education. P responded that he did not have the assets or income to make a substantial contribution. The master recommended that P could contribute to half of the expenses remaining after deducting student loans, grants, work study, the son's savings, and contributions of the paternal grandmother. The trial court approved the recommendation. P appeals.

Issue:Does the trial court have jurisdiction over post-majority college expenses?

Rule:In New Hampshire the court's jurisdiction in custody, maintenance, and education of children in divorce and separate maintenance is conferred by statute. The plain meaning of the pertinent statutes and their legislative history grant the trial court discretion to order payment of postmajority college expenses

Holding: Yes. Judgment affirmed. Supreme Court held that: (1) statute providing for termination of child support when child finishes high school or reaches age of 18 does not eliminate court's discretion to order divorced parent to contribute to adult child's college expenses, and (2) statutes authorizing court to order such contribution by divorced, but not married, parents did not violate equal protection guarantees.

Analysis:When the parties divorced, the trial court did not enter a support order against either party. Prior to the son's enrollment in a private college, the mother sought contribution for college expenses. The court affirmed the order mandating the father's contribution. The court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the contribution under the circumstances. Further, the contribution order did not violate equal protection as the classification between divorced and nondivorced parents, created in N.H. Rev. Stat. A, served the legitimate state interest of ensuring that children of divorced families were not deprived of educational opportunities solely because their families were not intact. Finding that §§ 458.17 and 458.20 were rationally related to that interest, the court rejected the equal protection challenge.