FRANCIS v. FRANKLIN
471 U.S. 307 (1965)


FACTS: Franklin (D) shot an individual during the course of his prison escape. Franklin (D) was tried, and he contested only the element of intent. The trial judge instructed the jury that a rebuttable presumption applied, indicating that the acts of a person of sound mind are presumed to be intended by that person. Franklin (D) was convicted and appealed, contending this instruction shifted the burden of proof on that issue to him and thus violated his constitutional rights. Francis (P) contended that the instruction gave rise to a permissive presumption, allowing rather than requiring the jury to presume intent. The prosecution then still bore the burden of persuading the jury to make that presumption. The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted a hearing.

ISSUE: Is a mandatory rebuttable presumption in favor of the prosecution on any fact necessary to prove the crime charged unconstitutional?

RULE: A mandatory rebuttable presumption in favor of the prosecution on any fact necessary to prove the crime charged is unconstitutional.

HOLDING AND DECISION: (Brennan, J.) Yes. A mandatory rebuttable presumption in favor of the prosecution on any fact necessary to prove the crime charged is unconstitutional. This instruction specifically states the acts of a person of sound mind are presumed international. This language points to a mandatory presumption. Such a mandatory presumption requires the jury to find a particular fact, unless the defense meets a burden of rebutting it. This shifts the burden of proof to the defense. Because the defense has the burden of disproving a necessary element of the crime, in this case intent, the constitutional requirement that the prosecution bear this burden is breached. Thus, the instruction was reversible error. Revered.

DISSENT: (Powell, J.) Standing alone, this instruction appears to require the jury to find a particular fact. However, when read in context with further explanatory language, it does not lead an ordinary juror to believe the instruction is a mandatory presumption. It leaves the burden of persuasion with the prosecution and thus is not unconstitutional.

ANALYSIS: This case expands upon this holding. Some commentators suggested that the holding in Francis should be limited as applying only where the burden is shifted on the only contested issue in this case.