Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan
785 S.W.2d 263 (1990)


PROCEDURE:On appeal to review the New Workers' Compensation Board's decision, reversing the Old Workers'
Compensation Board's decision denying the plaintiff's benefits.

FACTS: Church decided to hire Hogan to paint the church. They also decided that Petty would be hired to assist if any was needed. When Hogan was hired, no mention was made of hiring a helper at that time. Hogan painted by himself until he reached a difficult portion of the building. He discussed hiring a helper and nothing was said of having to hire Petty.
Hogan approached his brother who he had hired in the past on a number of Church jobs and his brother, Sam, accepted. The ladder broke and Sam was injured and taken to the hospital. The Elders found out about Sam's employment at that time. Hogan reported the accident to the treasurer and was told that there was insurance and the treasurer paid his brother for the work performed prior to the accident. It is undisputed that the Church is an insured employer under Workers' Compensation. Hogan filed a claim under the Act. The Old Board ruled that Sam was not an employee. The New Board reversed. Petitioners argue that the New Board erred in finding that Hogan possessed implied authority as an agent to hire Sam. They contend there was neither implied nor apparent authority.

ISSUE: Does an agent who is told to hire whomever he chooses have implied or apparent authority to hire any person to assist him?

RULE: “Apparent authority” is not actual authority but is the authority the agent is held out by the principal as possessing; it is a matter of appearances on which third parties come to rely.

HOLDING: The employer hired a church member to paint its building, and during previous jobs, it allowed the member to employ his brother (employee) to assist him. The employee was injured on the first day at work, and the employee paid the church member for the hours worked by the employee prior to the injury. The employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, and the old board denied compensation. The new board later reversed that decision and remanded the case to an administrative law judge to determine the amount of compensation, and the employer appealed. On appeal, the court affirmed the new board's reversal of the old board's decision denying benefits and held that because no facts were in dispute, the new board's consideration of employment status was a question of law, not of fact. The court found that the workers' compensation statute specifically allowed recovery under both express and implied employment agreements, that it applied to all helpers and assistants of employees whether paid by the employer or employee, and that the employee was an employee of the employer under the statute.